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1. Introduction 
This paper presents a computational analysis of the potential economic effects of 
trade liberalization in various regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) that 
have been negotiated in recent years and the negotiations currently in process, as well as 
the effects of global (multilateral) free trade. The analysis is based on the Michigan 
Model of World Production and Trade. The Michigan Model is a 
multi-country/multi-sector computational general equilibrium (CGE) model of the 
global trading system that has been designed to analyze the economic effects of 
multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade negotiations and a variety of other changes in 
trade and related policies. 
In this paper, we examine following six bilateral FTAs, four regional FTAs, and 
multilateral free trade. 
Bilateral FTA 
- Australia – New Zealand 
- Japan – Singapore 
- Japan – Mexico 
- Chile – Korea 
- Australia – United States 
- Singapore – United States 
Regional FTA 
- ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
- AFTA – China 
- European Union (EU) – Mexico 
- North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
Multilateral free trade 
In what follows, Section 2 briefly discusses the key issues in understanding the 
results of CGE studies: “rules of thumb,” coverage, and the evaluation of CGE models. 
Section 3 examines the potential economic effects of trade liberalization in various 
regional and bilateral FTAs that have been negotiated in recent years and the 
negotiations currently in process, as well as the effects of global (multilateral) free trade. 
Section 4 summarizes major findings and discusses policy implications. 
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2. Key Issues in Understanding the Results of CGE Studies: “Rules of Thumb,” 
Coverage, and Evaluation 
A number of CGE studies have examined the potential economic effects of FTAs. 
Since different models yielded different results, it is sometimes not easy to understand 
what is going on in the models.
1 Before going into the analysis, it is useful to discuss 
the key issues in understanding the results of CGE studies. Specifically, we discuss 
“rules of thumb,” coverage, and evaluation of the model. 
2.1. “Rules of Thumb” of the CGE Models 
Although CGE studies are regarded as one of the useful ways to compute the 
potential benefits of free trade, the complex interrelationships of the functions in the 
model sometimes make it difficult to identify which factors drives the results. Before 
going into the analysis, therefore, this section summarizes the “rules of thumb” of CGE 
models. There are three key aspects to interpret the results of CGE model. 
First aspect is the simulation scenario. Recent CGE studies such as Harrison, 
Rutherford, and Tarr (2003) and Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2006) found that countries 
included in an FTA almost always gain. This is because of the trade creation effect. 
However, the effects on countries excluded from an FTA are not clear. The complex 
production and trade patterns of intermediate goods sometimes offset the trade diversion 
effects, which results in the gains to the non-member countries. In this connection, it is 
also confirmed that the gains from multilateral trade liberalization to the world were 
significantly larger than those from a network of bilateral and regional FTA.
2
Second aspect is concerning trade externalities, or exogenous shocks other than 
trade liberalization such as productivity growth associated with trade liberalization. 
Robinson and Thierfleader (2002) pointed out that the gains from an FTA tended to be 
large if the model incorporated trade externalities.
3 Note, however, that there is no 
consensus on the channels and scales of externalities and, therefore, it is difficult to tell 
how much productivity gains we have with the trade liberalization. The productivity 
1  Piermartini and Teh (2005) provided a literature review on the recent CGE studies of multilateral 
trade negotiations. 
2  See, for instance, Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (2003) and Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2006). 
3  For instance, Ando and Urata (2005, Table 7) found that the effects of ASEAN plus Three (China, 
Japan, and Korea) FTA on real gross domestic output (GDP) of Japan were 0.01 percent if the 
simulation incorporated trade liberalization only. They also found that the effects amounted to 0.31 
percent once the simulation includes trade externalities (i.e., various facilitations and coordination) 
in addition to trade liberalization and capital accumulation. 
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growth is tended to incorporate into models as “ad-hoc” exogenous shock.
4 Similarly, 
the exogenous shocks of capital accumulation sometimes bring large gains from trade 
liberalization. In order to provide reliable numbers, sensitivity analysis of trade 
externalities and/or exogenous shocks should be presented if such mechanisms are 
incorporated into the simulation. The abuse of exogenous trade externalities should be 
avoided, especially when the study is used to design policies. 
Third aspect is the model structure. In particular, the expected results sometimes 
depend on whether the model is static or not. The welfare gains of dynamic model tend 
to be larger than those of static model (Robinson and Thierfleader, 2002). However, 
Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (2003) claimed that the dynamic models did not reverse 
the conclusions obtained from the static models. 
Some studies also claimed that the results depended on whether the model 
assumes perfect competition or not. For instance, Robinson and Thierfleader (2002) 
argued that the welfare gains become large if the model used in the study is 
“sophisticated.” In other words, the larger welfare gains will be obtained from the 
model with imperfect competition than the model with perfect competition, which is 
also found by Roland-Holst, Reinert, and Shiells (1994) and Francois and Roland-Holst 
(1997). Note, however, that a model has to introduce the Armington assumption in order 
to model perfect competition and describe intra-industry trade at the same time. Since 
the Armington assumption means that every country has some market powers, it 
sometimes generates large terms-of-trade effects. Therefore, the larger gains can be 
attributable to the abolition of the Armington assumption rather than the introduction of 
imperfect competition although it is difficult to distinguish these two effects. 
2.2. Coverage of the CGE Model 
2.2.1. Merchandise Trade 
Most of CGE models and data cover both merchandise trade and its tariff 
barriers. One of the most popular data is GTAP database of Purdue University. The trade 
data of GTAP database are constructed from the United Nation’s COMTRADE 
database.
5 GTAP also constructed tariff- and non-tariff barriers of merchandise trade. 
Specifically, the GTAP constructs the data of average import tariff rates, average export 
subsidy rates, and agricultural domestic support (i.e., output subsidies, intermediate 
input subsidies, land-based payments). Other protection measures such as anti-dumping 
4  Some more “sophisticated” treatments are to assume that productivity is a simple function of 
“something” such as exports (DeMelo and Robinson, 1992). 
5  Accordingly, the input-output tables in GTAP database are “updated” to maintain the internal 
consistency. 
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duties, price undertaking, and voluntary export restrains (VERs) are not available in the 
GTAP version 5.4. For more detail about GTAP database, see Dimaranan and 
McDougall (2002). 
2.2.2. Services Trade 
There are several studies that try to examine the effects of services trade 
liberalization. There are two problems to be overcome. First, how do we capture 
services trade? CGE studies overcome this problem by using input-output table. If 
input-output table reports the services trade as well as merchandise trade, the first 
problem does not seem to be a problem. Note, however, that definition and coverage of 
input-output table are different from those of GATS/WTO. For instance, input-output 
table does not cover the transaction of patent payments. 
Second, how do we quantify the barriers to trade in services? According to Stern 
(2002), there are four types of the measurement of barriers to trade in services: 
frequency measures, price-based measures, quantity-based measures, and 
financial-based measures.
6 Since the price data on service types are difficult to obtain, 
existing studies often use frequency measures, quantity-based measures, or 
financial-based measures. 
One of the most commonly used frequency measure is the frequency ratio that is 
constructed on the basis of the number of commitments scheduled in the GATS by each 
country.
7 The frequency ratio is consistent with the schedules of the GATS, but there 
are some pitfalls.
8 First, the frequency ratio does not mean absolute ad valorem tariff 
equivalents but means the relative degree of restriction. This makes it difficult to 
compare the ratios across sectors. Second, the equal weight is given to the different 
types of restrictions. Finally, the absence of positive country commitments in the GATS 
schedule is sometimes assumed to indicate the presence of restriction. 
Quantity-based measures are typically based on residuals generated by 
econometric models. Specifically, the barriers in quantity-based measures are defined as 
the difference between observed trade and predicted trade. However, the residuals can 
depend upon the specification.
9 Moreover, Whalley (2004) pointed out that “barrier 
estimates obtained in this way could be negative even when no trade restricting 
6  For a more detailed explanation of these measures, see Stern (2002). 
7 This yields 1240 total commitments on market access and national treatment (155 sectors and 
subsectors × 4 modes of supply × 2 commitment categories). 
8 For the detailed discussion of pitfalls in the measurement of services trade barriers, see Stern 
(2002) and Whalley (2004). 
9  Leamer (1988) argued that the difference between actual and predicted trade might not necessarily 
reflect barriers of trade. 
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interventions apply. Also, quantity-based measures can be positive even when frequency 
indices are zero.” 
Financial-based measures use financial data on gross operating margins 
calculated by sector and country. Since the financial-based measures are indirect 
measures to capture services barriers, it is difficult to take account of the differences in 
the quality and variety of services for different sectors and countries. Nonetheless, Stern 
(2002) has stressed that the financial-based measures are promising because these 
measures can be constructed for many sectors and countries and are therefore useful as a 
first approximation of the cost-raising effects of services. Hoeckman (2000) also 
suggested that financial-based measures could provide some sense of the relative 
magnitude of barriers to entry/exit that may exist. 
2.2.3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Another important issue is foreign direct investment (FDI) since FDI related 
issues are sometimes discussed in the negotiation of FTA. Although previous studies 
recognize the importance, most of them did not incorporate the effects of FDI. The 
difficulty is in the data availability. If FDI data were available like trade data, FDI can 
be incorporated into a CGE model like international trade. In reality, however, it is 
difficult to identify both source and destination at the industry level. 
Despite the limited availability of FDI data, Hanslow, Phamduc, and Verikios 
(2000) constructed the CGE model that incorporates the FDI. This study follows the 
framework proposed by Petri (1997) where product varieties are assumed to be 
differentiated by firms headquartered in different regions.
10 Capital is assumed to less 
than perfectly mobile across countries and sectors and allocated according to the rate of 
return to capital. FDI stock data are estimated from various sources while barriers of 
FDI are modeled as taxes on capital.
11 A reduction in FDI barriers thus means the 
increases in rate of return to capital, which leads to an increase in inward FDI flows 
(and accordingly, FDI stock) in that country. 
Although this approach looks attractive, there are some limitations. One of the 
biggest limitations might be the limited number of industries. Lack of the FDI sectoral 
data limits the number of industries is only three (agriculture, manufacturing, and 
services), which is not enough information in designing the policy.
12
10  Lee and van der Mensbrugghe (2001) also employed similar framework although they did not 
provide detailed explanation about the source of FDI data. 
11  For more detail about the FDI data in FTAP model, see Hanslow, Phamduc, and Verikios (2000). 
12  There are some studies that incorporate FDI as exogenous shocks such as increases in capital 
stock with FTA. However, such use of FDI shocks causes similar problems to trade externalities. 
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2.2.4. Safe Guard (SG) and Rules of Origin (ROO) 
Although many scholars recognize that safe guard (SG) and the rules of origin 
(ROO) are important issues to be included in the CGE model, no studies have been 
tackled these problems. One of the main reasons is the availability of the data. For 
instance, in order to examine the effects of SG, the detailed commodity level trade, 
production, and consumption data are needed. Even if trade data are available, 
corresponding production and consumption data are difficult to obtain. 
The ROO is much more difficult to incorporate into the model since, first of all, 
it is not easy to define the “origin.” The “origin” can be defined as the country where 
the specific process is made, where the largest value is added, or where the final change 
of harmonized system (HS) code is made. Indeed, there is no consensus on the 
definition of “origin” and, therefore, various definitions are used in different FTAs. 
Besides, it is impossible to trace the “origin” of the products by an input-output table, 
once the imported products used as intermediate inputs of some products. 
2.3. Evaluation of the Performance of the CGE Models 
Despite the large number of CGE studies, only a few studies evaluate the 
performance of the previous studies. Gelhar (1997) evaluated the performance of the 
GTAP model. He first backcasted the export shares from 1992 to 1982, and checked the 
correlation between predicted and actual changes in export shares. The result suggested 
that the model under-predicted changes in export shares of some regions (i.e. East Asian 
countries), but the model predicted the direction of changes well. 
Fox (2004) evaluated the performance of the Michigan Model. Conducting the 
NAFTA simulation by the Michigan Model, Fox (2004) calculated the correlation 
between predicted and actual imports. He concluded that the Michigan Model predicted 
the general patterns of trade relatively well although it under-predicted the magnitude of 
changes in trade flows. 
Kehoe (2005) evaluated the performance of the Michigan Model as well as other 
two models that examined the NAFTA. He examined the correlation between predicted 
and actual changes in exports and found that all models including the Michigan Model 
did not present a good performance. He criticized that all models rely on the “New Trade 
Theory,” which in turn means that trade is driven by the Dixit-Stiglitz type utility or 
Besides, the exogenous increases in domestic capital stock tend to have tremendously large positive 
impacts on production and thus welfare. Since it is difficult to expect how much FDI is caused by 
FTA, the introduction of FDI as an exogenous shock is not easy to justify. 
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production functions. As Yi (2003) suggested, Dixit-Stiglitz type variety functions 
cannot explain the recent growth of international trade. 
With the limited availability of the evaluation studies, it is difficult to conclude 
the reliability of the CGE models. But previous evaluation studies suggest that the CGE 
models at least predicted the direction and the pattern of trade relatively well. Since the 
scale largely depends upon the functional forms and elasticities, the development of 
new functional forms and estimation of more reliable elasticities are necessary steps to 
increase the reliabilities. 
3. Potential Economic Effects of Bilateral, Regional, and Multilateral Free Trade 
3.1. The Michigan Model of World Production and Trade 
3.1.1. Overview of the Michigan Model 
The modeling framework to be used largely depends upon the availability of 
comprehensive data on services trade and FDI. For instance, Dee and Hanslow (2001) 
and Brown and Stern (2001) explicitly link parents and affiliates. But the lack of 
detailed FDI data makes it difficult to disaggregate sectors, which in part is why these 
authors used a 3-sector CGE model (agriculture, manufacturing, and services). But 
perhaps more binding constraint was that these services/FDI models proved very 
difficult to disaggregate and were difficult to show computationally. 
The other group of studies treats services like goods and thus cannot take into 
account important aspects of FDI. But these studies typically disaggregate sectors and 
are well grounded in “standard” trade theory. 
The version of the Michigan Model used in this paper is in the spirit of this 
second group of models. It analyzes services trade liberalization in response to the 
removal of services barriers. The model covers 18 economic sectors in each of 22 
countries/regions, in Table 1. The distinguishing feature of the Michigan Model is that it 
incorporates some aspects of trade with imperfect competition, including increasing 
returns to scale, monopolistic competition, and product variety. A more complete 
description of the formal structure and equations of the model can be found on line at 
www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model/.
13 The detailed description of the Michigan 
Model is presented in the Technical Appendix. 
=== Table 1 === 
3.1.2. Sectors and Market Structure 
13  See also Deardorff and Stern (1990, pp. 9-46) and Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2006). 
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As mentioned, the version of the model to be used here consists of 18 production 
sectors and 22 countries/regions (plus rest-of-world). The sectoral and country/region
coverage are indicated in the tables below. Agriculture is modeled as perfectly 
competitive with product differentiation by country of origin, and all other sectors 
covering manufactures and services are modeled as monopolistically competitive. Each 
monopolistically competitive firm produces a differentiated product and sets price as a 
profit-maximizing mark-up of price over marginal cost. Free entry and exit of firms then 
guarantees zero profits. 
3.2. Data
3.2.1. Base Data 
Apart from numerous share parameters, the model requires various types of 
elasticity measures. Like other CGE models, most of my data come from published 
sources. The main data source used in the model is the GTAP-5.4 Database of the 
Purdue University Center for Global Trade Analysis Project (Dimaranan and 
McDougall, 2002). The reference year for this GTAP database is 1997. From this source, 
we have extracted the following data, aggregated to my sectors and countries/regions:
14
- Bilateral trade flows among 22 countries/regions, decomposed into 18 sectors. Trade 
with the rest-of-world (ROW) is included to close the model. 
- Input-output tables for the 22 countries/regions, excluding ROW. 
- Components of final demand along with sectoral contributions for the 22 
countries/regions, excluding ROW. 
- Gross value of output and value added at the sectoral level for the 22 
countries/regions, excluding ROW. 
- Bilateral import tariffs by sector among the 22 countries/regions. 
- Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor by sector. 
- Bilateral export-tax equivalents among the 22 countries/regions, decomposed into 
18 sectors. 
The monopolistically competitive market structure in the nonagricultural sectors of the 
model imposes an additional data requirement of the numbers of firms at the sectoral 
level, and there is need also for estimates of sectoral employment. The employment data, 
which have been adapted from a variety of published sources, will be noted in tables 
below. 
The GTAP-5.4 1997 database has been projected to the year 2005, which is 
when the Uruguay Round liberalization will have been fully implemented. In this 
14  The country/region and sectoral mappings are indicated in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 
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connection, we extrapolated the labor availability in different countries/regions by an 
average weighted population growth rate of 1.2 percent per annum. All other major 
variables have been projected, using an average weighted growth rate of GDP of 2.5 
percent. 
The 2005 data have been adjusted to take into account two major developments 
that have occurred in the global trading system since the mid-1990s. These include: (1) 
implementation of the Uruguay Round negotiations that were completed in 1993-94 and 
were to be phased in over the following decade; and (2) the accession of Mainland 
China and Taiwan to the WTO in 2001.
15 We have made allowance for the foregoing 
developments by readjusting the 2005 scaled-up database for benchmarking purposes to 
obtain an approximate picture of what the world may be expected to look like in 2005. 
In the computational scenarios to be presented below, we use these re-adjusted data as 
the starting point to carry out my liberalization scenarios for the U.S. bilateral FTAs and 
for the accompanying unilateral and global free trade scenarios. 
  The GTAP-5.4 1997 database for tariffs is broken down by sector on a global 
basis and bilaterally for existing and prospective FTA partners of Japan in Table 2. The 
post-Uruguay Round tariff rates on agriculture, mining, and manufactures are applied 
rates and are calculated in GTAP by dividing tariff revenues by the value of imports by 
sector.
16
=== Table 2 === 
3.2.2. Measurement of Trade Barriers in Services 
The GTAP-5.4 1997 database does not report any trade barriers in services. In 
this paper, services barriers are based on financial data on average gross (price-cost) 
margins. The data were constructed initially by Hoekman (2000) and adapted for 
modeling purposes in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002) and Brown, Kiyota, and Stern 
(2006). The gross operating margins are calculated as the differences between total 
revenues and total operating costs. Some of these differences are presumably 
attributable to fixed costs. Given that the gross operating margins vary across countries, 
15 The tariff data for the WTO accession of China and Taiwan have been adapted from 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2004). 
16  Note that the barriers are measured at year 2005, not at the initial year of negotiation. The 
simulation can examine how much effects are expected from the removal of these (current) barriers 
but cannot do how much effects are expected from the FTA. If the process of free trade has already 
been started, we might underestimate the effects of FTA. For instance, the large “potential” effects 
are not expected from the NAFTA since the removal of trade barriers has already been completed 
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. 
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a portion of the margin can also be attributed to barriers to FDI. For this purpose, a 
benchmark is set for each sector in relation to the country with the smallest gross 
operating margin, on the assumption that operations in the benchmark country can be 
considered to be freely open to foreign firms. The excess in any other country above this 
lowest benchmark is then taken to be due to barriers to establishment by foreign firms. 
That is, the barrier is modeled as the cost-increase attributable to an increase in 
fixed cost borne by multinational corporations attempting to establish an enterprise 
locally in a host country. This abstracts from the possibility that fixed costs may differ 
among firms because of variations in market size, distance from headquarters, and other 
factors. It is further assumed that this cost increase can be interpreted as an ad valorem
equivalent tariff on services transactions generally.
17 It can be seen in Table 2 that the 
constructed services barriers are considerably higher than the import barriers on 
manufactures. While possibly subject to overstatement, it is generally acknowledged 
that many services sectors are highly regulated and thus restrain international services 
transactions. 
3.3. Results
Table 3 presents the simulation results. This table indicates the expected welfare 
gains relative to GDP, by country. We also examine the difference of the impacts on 
member and non-member countries. The effects on member (and non-member) 
countries are computed from the sum of the welfare gains of member (non-member) 
countries divided by the sum of the GDP of member (non-member) countries. Shaded 
cells mean the member countries of each FTA. 
=== Table 3 === 
The results of bilateral FTA indicate that the potential benefits for member 
countries are the largest in Korea-Singapore FTA (KOR-SGP FTA), followed by the 
Australia-U.S. FTA (AUS-USA FTA). The expected welfare gains of member countries 
are 0.27 percent of GDP for Korea and Singapore and 0.23 percent for United States and 
Australia. The bilateral FTA sometimes causes negative welfare effects on non-member 
countries but the negative effects are small, indicating less than 0.03 percent of GDP (in 
absolute values). 
17  Note that these margins are not related to the government revenues. In that sense, the margins are 
interpreted as rents and there are entry barriers in services sectors before the liberalization. The 
liberalization in services sectors can thus be interpreted as the removal of entry barriers for both 
domestic and foreign firms to ensure market access. 
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The effects of regional FTA present larger figures than those of bilateral FTA. 
Expected effects of AFTA, AFTA-China (AFTA-CHN), and EU-Mexico (EU-MEX) for 
member countries are 2.25 percent, 1.93 percent, and 0.32 percent, respectively. The 
expected effects of AFTA are larger than those of AFTA-China because of the size of 
Chinese economy. Although the effects of regional FTA on non-member countries are 
generally larger than those of bilateral FTA, the effects are still very small, indicating 
less than 0.1 percent of GDP (in absolute values). 
Note that the potential effects of NAFTA are almost equal to zero. This does not 
mean that the NAFTA did not have any contribution to the increases in welfare. As 
discussed above, the simulation is based on the removal of trade barriers in 2005. The 
negligible effects of NAFTA are thus attributed to the fact that the process of free trade 
in NAFTA has already completed in 2005. 
It is also interesting to note that the potential economic benefits become large (in 
terms of the percentage of GDP) if the size of the country become small relative to other 
member countries. This result suggests that the small countries tend to have large 
benefits from free trade. Since the size of developing countries is small in general, the 
developing countries might have large gains from the FTA between developed and 
developing countries if developed country open its markets without any exception. 
Finally, the effects of multilateral free trade are significantly larger than those of 
bilateral and regional FTAs. The average welfare effects are 7.0 percent of GDP. 
Developing countries tend to have larger welfare gains (e.g., 9.6 percent for China and 
Indonesia, 17.1 percent for the Philippines, 14.8 percent for Central America and 
Caribbean countries, and 10.9 percent for Morocco). The welfare effects of multilateral 
free trade tend to be smaller for developed countries but are significantly larger than 
those of bilateral and regional FTAs (e.g., 7.4 percent for Japan, 5.3 percent for the 
United States, and 7.3 percent for European Union). As Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 
(2003) and Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2006) indicated, the potential gains from the 
currently negotiated bilateral and regional FTA networks cannot overwhelm the effects 
of multilateral free trade. These results suggest the importance of free trade through 
multilateral negotiations. 
3.4. Discussion 
The results presented in Table 3 are much larger than the results obtained in 
previous studies. For instance, DeRosa and Gilbert (2004) examined that the effects of 
various U.S. FTAs based on the standard GTAP model and the GTAP database. Their 
results indicated that the effects of Australia-U.S. FTA on equivalent variation would be 
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0.02 percent of GDP for Australia and 0.01 percent of GDP for the United States. 
Similarly, the welfare effects of Singapore-U.S. FTA would be 0.43 percent for 
Singapore and 0.0 percent for the United States. Although the Michigan Model is 
different from the GTAP model in various aspects such as model structure, main reasons 
of the different results can be attributable to whether the model incorporates services 
trade liberalization or not.
18
Tables 4 and 5 indicate the decomposition of the welfare effects. Table 4 
indicates that the effects of liberalization in agricultural protection and manufactures 
tariffs combined are comparable to the results of DeRosa and Gilbert (2004). The effects 
of Australia-U.S. FTA are 0.10 percent of GDP for Australia and 0.03 percent of GDP 
for the United States. Similarly, the welfare effects of Singapore-U.S. FTA are 0.39 
percent for Singapore and 0.0 percent for the United States. 
=== Tables 4 and 5 === 
It is also interesting to note that the large part of welfare gains is attributable to 
the liberalization in either manufactures tariffs or services barriers. While developed 
countries mainly gain from the liberalization in services barriers, the major source of 
welfare gains in developing countries is in the removal of manufactures tariffs. The 
result implies that a key issue in trade liberalization is in the market access for 
developed countries while in the removal of barriers in manufacture products for 
developing countries. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper discusses the key issues of CGE studies and examined the potential 
effects of bilateral, regional, and multilateral free trade. The literature review suggests 
that we should be careful in interpreting the simulation results since some of the results 
are driven by the characteristics of the model rather than the effects of the trade 
liberalization itself. Although there are many limitations in CGE studies, some of the 
previous CGE models such as the Michigan Model perform well in predicting the 
direction of trade. 
To examine the potential effects of bilateral, regional, and multilateral free trade, 
we thus use the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. The scenarios cover 
18  As we discussed in Section 3.2.2, the GTAP-5.4 1997 database does not report any trade barriers 
in services. DeRosa and Gilbert (2004) thus acknowledged that “the simulation should be interpreted 
as representing the potential impacts of preferential tariff liberalization in merchandise goods only.” 
(p.389 and p.393). 
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six bilateral FTAs (Australia – New Zealand; Japan – Singapore; Japan – Mexico; 
Korea – Chile; United States – Australia; United States – Singapore), four regional 
FTAs (AFTA; AFTA – China; EU – Mexico; NAFTA), and multilateral free trade. The 
major findings of my simulation analysis are summarized as follows. First, among these 
six scenarios, the potential economic effects of bilateral FTAs are the largest in Korea – 
Singapore FTA. Second, the effects of regional FTA are larger than those of bilateral 
FTA. Third, the potential effects become large if the size of the country is small relative 
to other FTA member countries. Finally, the effects of multilateral free trade are 
significantly larger than those of bilateral and regional FTAs. 
My results clearly indicate that the best policy option is to pursue the 
multilateral free trade. The potential benefits from the multilateral free trade are 
overwhelming. Bilateral and regional FTAs can be alternative options to precede the 
free trade when multilateral negotiations are deadlocked. But we should note that it is 
not clear whether bilateral and regional FTAs become building blocks of the global free 
trade or stumbling blocks. Moreover, the expected results are based on the assumption 
that all member countries remove all trade barriers without any exceptions. Adding 
exception might make it complex the customs clearance. The accumulation of such 
burdens through the increases in FTA networks might offset the benefits of free trade. 
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Technical Appendix: The Structure of the Michigan Model 
Expenditure 
Consumers and producers are assumed to use a two-stage procedure to allocate 
expenditure across differentiated products. In the first stage, expenditure is allocated 
across goods without regard to the country of origin or producing firm. At this stage, the 
utility function is Cobb-Douglas, and the production function requires intermediate 
inputs in fixed proportions. In the second stage, expenditure on monopolistically 
competitive goods is allocated across the competing varieties supplied by each firm 
from all countries. In the perfectly competitive agricultural sector, since individual firm 
supply is indeterminate, expenditure is allocated over each country’s sector as a whole, 
with imperfect substitution between products of different countries. 
  The aggregation function in the second stage is a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) function. Use of the CES function and product differentiation by 
firm imply that consumer welfare is influenced both by any reduction in real prices 
brought about by trade liberalization, as well as increased product variety. The elasticity 
of substitution among different varieties of a good is assumed to be three, a value that is 
broadly consistent with available empirical estimates. The parameter for the sensitivity 
of consumers to the number of product varieties is set at 0.5.
19
Production 
  The production function is separated into two stages. In the first stage, 
intermediate inputs and a primary composite of capital and labor are used in fixed 
proportion to output.
20 In the second stage, capital and labor are combined through a 
CES function to form the primary composite. In the monopolistically competitive 
sectors, additional fixed inputs of capital and labor are required. It is assumed that fixed 
capital and fixed labor are used in the same proportion as variable capital and variable 
labor so that production functions are homothetic. The elasticities of substitution 
between capital and labor vary across sectors and were derived from a literature search 
of empirical estimates of sectoral supply elasticities. Economies of scale are determined 
19 If the variety parameter is greater than 0.5, it means that consumers value variety more. If the 
parameter is zero, consumers have no preference for variety. This is the same as the Armington 
assumption according to which consumers view products as distinguished by country of production. 
For the sensitivity tests of alternative parameter values, see Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2005). 
20  Intermediate inputs include both domestic and imported varieties. 
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endogenously in the model.
21
Supply Prices 
To determine equilibrium prices, perfectly competitive firms operate such that 
price is equal to marginal cost, while monopolistically competitive firms maximize 
profits by setting price as an optimal mark-up over marginal cost. The numbers of firms 
in sectors under monopolistic competition are determined by the zero profits condition. 
The free entry condition in this context is also the basic mechanism through which new 
product varieties are created (or eliminated). Each of the new entrants arrives with a 
distinctly different product, expanding the array of goods available to consumers. 
Free entry and exit are also the means through which countries are able to 
realize the specialization gains from trade. In this connection, it can be noted that in a 
model with nationally differentiated products, which relies on the Armington 
assumption, production of a particular variety of a good cannot move from one country 
to another. In such a model, there are gains from exchange but no gains from 
specialization. However, in the Michigan Model with differentiated products supplied 
by monopolistically competitive firms, production of a particular variety is 
internationally mobile. A decline in the number of firms in one country paired with an 
expansion in another essentially implies that production of one variety of a good or 
services is being relocated from the country in which the number of firms is declining to 
the country in which the number of firms is expanding. Thus, we have both an exchange 
gain and a specialization gain from international trade.
22
Capital and Labor Markets 
Capital and labor are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors within each 
country. Returns to capital and labor are determined so as to equate factor demand to an 
exogenous supply of each factor. The aggregate supplies of capital and labor in each 
country are assumed to remain fixed so as to abstract from macroeconomic 
considerations (e.g., the determination of investment), since my microeconomic focus is 
21  Note that, in the monopolistic competition model, average cost increases with the increases in the 
number of firms in the industry while it declines with the increases in market size (i.e., economies of 
scale). Since the entry of firms continues as long as there is a positive profits (i.e., price is greater 
than average cost), the equilibrium is determined once the market size is determined. 
22 The international relocation of a particular variety of a good can be understood in the context of 
the ongoing outsourcing debate. Domestic firms require intermediate inputs, in addition to capital 
and labor. To the extent that tariff reduction leads a firm to substitute toward traded intermediate 
inputs, domestic firms can be thought of as outsourcing some component of production. This is 
particularly the case if there is a decline in the number of domestic firms in the sector from which 
intermediate inputs are purchased and an expansion in the supplier country. 
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on the inter-sectoral allocation of resources. 
World Market and Trade Balance 
The world market determines equilibrium prices such that all markets for goods 
and services clear. Total demand for each firm or sector’s product must equal total 
supply of that product. It is also assumed that trade remains balanced for each 
country/region, that is, any initial trade imbalance remains constant as trade barriers are 
changed. This is accomplished by permitting aggregate expenditure to adjust to 
maintain a constant trade balance. Thus, we abstract away from the macroeconomic 
forces and policies that are the main determinants of trade imbalances on goods and 
services. Further, it should be noted that there are no nominal rigidities in the model. As 
a consequence, there is no role for a real exchange rate mechanism. 
Trade Policies and Rent/Revenues 
We have incorporated into the model the import tariff rates and export 
taxes/subsidies as policy inputs that are applicable to the bilateral trade of the various 
countries/regions with respect to one another. These have been computed using the 
“GTAP-5.4 Database” provided in Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). The export 
barriers have been estimated as export-tax equivalents. we assume that revenues from 
both import tariffs and export taxes, as well as rents from NTBs on exports, are 
redistributed to consumers in the tariff- or tax-levying country and are spent like any 
other income. 
Tariff liberalization can affect economic efficiency through three main channels. 
First, in the context of standard trade theory, tariff reductions both reduce the cost of 
imports for consumers and for producers purchasing traded intermediate inputs, thus 
producing an exchange gain. Second, tariff removal leads firms to direct resources 
toward those sectors that have the greatest value on the world market. That is, we have 
the standard specialization gain. Third, tariff reductions have a pro-competitive effect on 
sellers. Increased price pressure from imported varieties force incumbent firms to cut 
price. Surviving firms remain viable by expanding output, thereby moving down their 
average total cost (ATC) curve. The consequent lower ATC of production creates gains 
from the realization of economies of scale. 
Model Closure and Implementation 
  We assume in the model that aggregate expenditure varies endogenously to 
hold aggregate employment constant. This closure is analogous to the Johansen closure 
1919
rule (Deardorff and Stern, 1990, pp. 27-29). The Johansen closure rule consists of 
keeping the requirement of full employment while dropping the consumption function. 
This means that consumption can be thought of as adjusting endogenously to ensure full 
employment. However, in the present model, we do not distinguish consumption from 
other sources of final demand. That is, we assume instead that total expenditure adjusts 
to maintain full employment. 
  The model is solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). When 
policy changes are introduced into the model, the method of solution yields percentage 
changes in sectoral employment and certain other variables of interest. Multiplying the 
percentage changes by the absolute levels of the pertinent variables in the database 
yields the absolute changes, positive or negative, which might result from the various 
liberalization scenarios. 
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